Abstract-In the EU, several governments have introduced or are contemplating a capacity mechanism to ensure adequate investment in generation capacity. Previous research has analyzed the impacts of capacity mechanisms on installed capacity and cost to consumers in case of efficient regulation. By contrast we find that the choice between capacity mechanisms may be influenced by the extent of regulatory errors as well as whether the mechanisms evaluated from the perspective of consumer cost or from a welfare perspective.
INTRODUCTION
During recent years the idea that the regulator should intervene to ensure that sufficient generation capacity is constructed has regained popularity among governments Regulators in Columbia, Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, France, Germany and Great Britain have either considered or implemented some form of capacity mechanism [1]- [7] . There are reasons both in favor and against the implementation of a capacity mechanism. The argument hinges on the degree to which liberalized energy only markets on their own, in combination with markets for long-term contracts or an additional capacity mechanism, can make sure that the welfare efficient amount of capacity is built.
Liberalized energy only markets on their own would lead to efficient investment levels in case of risk neutrality and perfect competition [8] . As a result of risk aversion, however, generators will provide less capacity while consumers would prefer more than the amount of capacity that is efficient under risk neutrality [9] .
Markets for long-term contracts in addition to the energy only market could solve this problem by enabling a risk transfer from generators to suppliers. However, it has been shown by [9] , [10] that in absence of regulatory intervention retail competition undermines the incentive to sign sufficient amounts of long-term contracts. Another reason for sub-optimal long-term contracting levels in unregulated markets may be due to market power. Following [11] , an extensive literature has developed around the impact of markets for forward contracts [12] - [16] and more recently also call options [16] - [18] on the ability of incumbents to exert market power. Most of the authors conclude that forward markets reduce market power but some doubt remains [15] .
In order to ensure that a welfare efficient amount of capacity is built, different capacity mechanisms have been proposed which allow the regulator to specifY the capacity target. Most of the analyses are focused on regulating the amount of option contracts [19] - [23] or capacity rights [24] , [25] that are purchased, but there is also a number of papers that provide a comparative analysis including several other capacity mechanisms [26] , [27] . So far these papers have mainly analyzed the degree to which capacity mechanisms can stabilize investment cycles or lower the cost to consumers, assumption that regulatory targets are set at an efficient level. Little attention has been given to the impacts on producer welfare, or the impact that would be caused by regulatory over-procurement and other forms of regulatory error. It could be possible, that regulatory errors destroy the benefits that would have been achieved by an efficiently implemented capacity mechanism.
We aim to fill this gap by analyzing the distributional implications of capacity mechanisms as well as the impact of non-optimal capacity targets, price caps, strike prices and dispatch of reserve plants on the efficiency of interventions. In section II we describe the investment model and the capacity mechanisms that we analyze. Sections III presents the results in absence of regulatory errors and section IV analyses the impact of regulatory errors. In section V we draw our conclusions about the impacts of capacity mechanisms on consumer and producer rents and the impact of regulatory errors.
II. ELECTRICITY MARKET INVESTMENT MODEL
In order to analyze the efficiency of different capacity mechanisms we use a strongly simplified model of the GB electricity market. Instead of a series of repetitive investment decisions, we model a single investment decision. As illustrated in Fig.l , at stage 1 of the decision process investors determine the capacity mix by adding or closing plants. This is followed in stage 2 by the uncertain realization of a load duration curve D out of a fixed set of possible load duration curves D y ,y E [1, .. Y] .. We assume that the probability Prey) of any load duration curve D = D y being realized is known to all investors in advance and is not affected by their investment decisions. We further assume that investors in our model are risk averse but not strategic, and that the fixed and variable cost of each generation technology is constant and known at the time of the investment. Within the energy markets, the price is the short run marginal cost of the most expensive unit and there are no start-up and shut-down cost so that plants are dispatched in merit order. In the event of loss of load, the price in the energy market is set equal to the administrative price cap. Within our model we assume the price cap is equal to the true value of lost load. The impact of price caps above or below the true value of lost load is investigated in section IV.
For each set of capacitIes
investors can therefore calculate the producer profit II j that a MW of technology j would make in case of a particular realization of the load duration curve D = D y on the basis of energy market revenues as: Based on the profit for different load duration curves, they can further calculate the mean and the variance of profits by weighting the profit which they would incur in case of load duration curve D = D y with the probability of this load duration curve being realized:
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Throughout the model, risk aversion is modeled by assuming that investors base their decision on the risk discounted expected profits per MW:
The factor r in this equation is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion. A larger value of r means that investors need to be paid a larger premium in order to compensate them for variation of the plant profits due to load uncertainty.
In order to calculate the set of capacities that would be provided by investors in the energy only market we use an iterative procedure that is illustrated in Fig.2 starting from the currently instaUed set of capacities wI from Table V in the appendix.
In each iteration step n, the next set of capacities Wn+l is calculated by closing all plants for which we expect a negative discounted profit in Wn and then adding the plant which, on a per MW basis, would make the highest discounted profits in wn ' , where wn ' is the original set of capacities, after closing alJ unprofitable plants, and plus one additional plant of the technology type l' that is investigated. That means the , expected profit Er [OJ] is the expected discounted profit which a plant of technology j would make in the original set of capacities Wn augmented by one additional plant of type j '. The size of the capacity increment between w and w' is equal to the standard unit size of technology l' in table V. This procedure is repeated until Wn+1 = Wn, that is alJ plants within Wn are profitable, but any additional plant would not recover its cost. This heuristic is consistent with our assumption of perfect competition, as it implies that each project is evaluated independently. A similar heuristic is also used by the Department of Energy and Climate Change [28] . Our insights about potential inefficiencies could therefore be directly relevant for their analyses. As a result of risk aversion, less than the optimal amount of plants may be built because the average expected profit is not enough to compensate for the variation of profits, so that the iteration stops at a lower capacity level.
This problem could be addressed by long-term contracts between market participants [16] . However, the counterparty risk due to retail competition could limit their ability to solve the problem of under investment [9] . Our present model does not include long-term contracts and only compares the investment levels resulting from the above iterative process based on spot market revenues against the investment levels resulting from the introduction of different capacity mechanisms in addition to spot market revenues.
A capacity mechanism can influence the total revenues of generators in three different ways. Firstly, a capacity mechanism may affect energy market revenues because the additional capacity reduces the frequency of price spikes as a result of scarcity. Secondly, a capacity mechanism may affect energy revenues by introducing a price uplift or a price cap. And thirdly, a capacity mechanism may provide an additional fixed payment in the form of a capacity premium in addition to the energy revenues. Most capacity mechanisms use a mixture of these approaches by making capacity payments conditional on the availability of plants in the energy market.
In this paper we consider the capacity mechanisms and reference scenarios described in Fig.3 .
The first best benchmark of welfare optimal capacity expansion.
Energy Market Target: The benchmark of cost optimal capacity expansion to meet regulatory capacity targets. 
III. RESULTS IN ABSENCE OF REGULA TOR Y ERRORS
In this section we analyze the impact of capacity mechanism in absence of regulatory errors. Different from most other analyses, we are not only comparing system variables -such as average cost, total welfare and instalJed capacity but also considering the distributional impacts on the consumer vs. producer rent and the generation mix. We find that the cost reductions which are achieved by physical reliability markets and capacity payments with a fixed total are primarily caused by shifting rents from producers to consumers. In addition to the welfare gains caused by changes in the generation portfolio, distributional implications are thus an important factor whose size depends on the degree of competition in spot and forward markets.
The welfare optimal capacity adjustments in our example lead to total capacity of 59.6 GW which would lead to an average of 1.1 h of load shedding per year. By comparison, in case of a risk aversion rate of r = Ie -9 the energy only market in our example would provide an equilibrium capacity of 59 GW and thus lead to a shortfall of 600MW compared to the welfare optimal capacity. This shortfall is explained by missing money of £9,000 IMW y that would occur in case of the welfare optimal capacity due to the risk aversion of investors. The small size of the shortfall is due to the absence of risks caused by fuel price and carbon price vanatlOns, or future investment levels. Higher levels of uncertainty should increase the amount of missing money caused by risk aversion. 
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Capacity and consumer cost resulting from a) energy market equilibrium, b) strategic reserve, c) capacity payment with fixed uplift, d) capacity payment with fixed total, e) physical reliability market and f) financial reliability market in absence of regulatory inefficiency.
As shown in Fig.4 , with the exception of the fmancial reliability market most capacity mechanisms are able to achieve the welfare efficient target of 59.6 GW. A financial reliability market does not lead to a capacity increase, because an additional plant would reduce to the likelihood of price spikes to a level, where the cost of purely financial contracts would be lower than the premium required by power plants. However, in absence of additional plants, the sellers of reliability contracts charge a risk premium on top of expected contract paybacks which increases the average cost to £64.1 IMWh compared to £64.0 IMWh in case of the energy only market.
A strategic reserve achieves the same total capacity as a capacity payment with fixed uplift. However, the average cost in case of a capacity payment with fixed uplift is significantly lower, because it results in a more efficient generation mix than the strategic reserve. In the current model this is caused by the fixed selection of oil as strategic reserve technology. However, even if the strategic reserve technology is chosen in a way that leads to the same technology mix, the inefficiency caused by despatching the strategic reserve as last resort still leads to a higher cost compared to the capacity payment with fixed uplift. The capacity payment with fixed total and the physical reliability market lead to an identical capacity mix and the same generation cost, because the resulting total capacity of 60.4 GW is enough to avoid load shedding even during growth years. As a result the reliability contract call option is always out of the money and therefore the payments for both mechanisms are the same.
The way how a capacity payment with fixed total and a physical reliability market achieve cost reductions despite higher capacity margins is illustrated in Fig.5 . The lower cost to consumers is mainly caused by a shift from producer to consumer rents (£l.5 billionly) and to a much smaller extent by the increase in total welfare caused by the additional plant (£14 millionly). Both of these effects are achieved by the substitution of one coal plant against a nuclear plant (shift of £501 million/y, welfare gain of £32 million/y), and by reimbursing no more than required for allowing new plants to recover their cost (shift of £ 942 million/y, welfare gain of -£18 millionly).
While the substitution of coal against nuclear would also be profitable in absence of a capacity payment, it requires a coordinated action which is not detected by our investment heuristic, because the coal plant would also have been profitable. In reality this substitution could be carried out by investors with a large portfolio. Individual players could force the substitution by constructing a nuclear plant in order to displace the existing coal unit. However, this is a risky strategy and therefore less likely to occur in absence of a capacity mechanism.
Virtually the entire revenue shift from producers to consumers is caused by a reduction of the excess profits which producers receive due to the lumpiness of investment, i.e. because any additional plant would depress prices to a level where it is not able to recover its cost. The reduction of such excess revenues is one of the potential benefits of a capacity mechanism. However, the extent to which the substitution effect and the reduction of excess revenues will occur in practice depends on the competitiveness of the capacity market. In our model we have assumed perfect competition in both markets. Imperfect competition could lead to price increases in either or both markets. In order to assess the potential impact of imperfect competition, an analysis of the entry barriers, in the form of site availability, liquidity requirements etc would be required. This is beyond the scope of this paper.
IV. IMPACT OF REGULATORY ERRORS
In this section we analyze the vulnerability of capacity mechanisms to regulatory errors. The likelihood of different magnitudes of regulatory error is inevitably subjective. In absence of historical data we assume the following worst case scenarios for each type of regulatory error which are described in Table I . 
WORST CASE OF REGULATORY ERRORS

Regulatory
Assumed Wo rst Case Error
SR dispatch
Drop dispatch price of strategic reserve from VOLL to £1,OOO/MWh expected to occur with probability of 90%. In Table II, Table III and Table IV we show how these error scenarios change the consumer cost, the producer profits and the total welfare compared to the energy market in absence of regulatory errors. From these tables we can observe that the only mechanisms which achieve a welfare gain are capacity payments with fixed total (b) and physical reliability markets (e). However, the welfare gains could be neutralized by excessive capacity targets. However, they can also not achieve an improvement compared to energy only markets (a).
Capacity payments with fixed uplift (c) achieve cost reductions mainly by reducing producer profits, while they remain vulnerable to excessive capacity targets.
A strategic reserve (t) finally leads to welfare reductions in all scenarios which are paid by consumers. Dispatch price errors create an additional risk which leads to substantial producer surplus that needs to be paid by consumers.
V.
CONCLUSIONS
Regulatory errors matter for the choice of capacity mechanisms. In order to protect against welfare losses caused by regulatory over-procurement, it would be most efficient to choose an energy-only market or a financial reliability market. In order to protect against welfare losses caused by misspecifications of the VOLL on the other hand, it would be more efficient to choose a physical reliability market or a capacity payment with a fixed total.
In addition to regulatory errors, the preferred choice of a capacity mechanism could also be influenced by the distribution of rents between consumers and producers. In our model, a large part of consumer cost reductions achieved by physical reliability markets and capacity payments with a fixed total are due to revenue shifts from producers to consumers. The revenue shift is large enough to ensure that despite the welfare loss caused by over-procurement, physical reliability markets and capacity payments with a fixed total still achieve a lower cost for consumers than the other capacity mechanisms and are thus always preferable from the perspective of consumers.
However, caution is warranted as limitations in our model could have an impact on the results. Whether or not a physical reliability market achieves revenue shifts from producers to consumers depends on the degree of competition in the forward markets vs. the spot markets. Further research would thus be needed which includes the impact of market power in capacity and energy markets.
